Originally aired on July 26, 1996 - In part 100 of our Civil War series, Virginia Tech history professor James Robertson says that no single measure in the four year history of the Confederacy caused more dissension among Southern society than the failure known as conscription.
#100 – Conscription
The most urgent task confronting the Southern Confederacy from start to end was manpower for the armies. Unbounded enthusiasm at the outset, coupled with quick victories, more than met the need for soldiers in the Civil War’s first months; but the military reverses early in 1862 at Roanoke Island, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh, along with mounting hardships both in camp and at home, quickly dampened eagerness for army life.
In the war’s second spring, at the urging of Jefferson Davis, R. E. Lee and several field commanders, the Confederate Congress enacted the first national conscription act in the history of English-speaking peoples. By its terms, all Southern males between the ages of 18 and 35 were susceptible to the draft. They were to serve for three years unless the Civil War ended sooner. Of greater importance, the conscription act extended the military terms of those one-year volunteers already in the armies.
Barely before the ink dried on this bill, the Congress began passing a series of exemption clauses that seemed to benefit the privileged classes the most. At the same time, many Southerners saw conscription as an act that not only usurped personal freedom but also made mockery of the cherished belief in state rights. A number of Southern governors openly and consistently fought implementation. A widespread shout arose throughout Southern society that conscription made for “a rich man’s war but a poor man’s fight” – the inference being that the wealthy elements had brought on the contest but the lower classes were having to fight it.
Typical of the reactions were the feelings of Thomas Caffey, a Montgomery, Alabama, soldier who would survive four years of action in the field. In February, 1863, then months after conscription (and its attendant exemptions) went into effect, Cafferty gave vent to his anger. He wrote this to his wife from an army encampment near Fredericksburg:
“I am glad that the (conscription) law is being enforced (in Alabama), and I hope that everyone able to do military duty will be forced into the ranks…to repel the enemy from our soil. These gentry are great at boasting what our army has done, but do not seem to remember that they have contributed nothing to promote the success of the cause, and I am now in favor of taking them (into the army) and if need be kill them in order to get them away from home. The trials and sufferings of this army have been greater than you can imagine; and as we have done our duty to the country, they ought to be made to do theirs.”
Caffey then switched to the subject of draftees. He declared: “The conscripts as a general thing are, I believe, worthless and unreliable in the hour of battle, but when advancing on an enemy we have a line of file closers behind the line of battle with orders to shoot down the first one that falters. In this way we get some right good fighting out of the scamps. The country is indebted to the original regiments for its salvation; and though our ranks have been badly thinned by disease and losses in battle, the Confederate States will have to still rely on those gallant veterans.”
An estimated 20% of the Confederate armies ultimately consisted of conscripts. The performance of some was outstanding; but in the main, they were reluctant soldiers whose patriotism was surface-deep and whose reliability was always suspect. Yet it was the system itself that was most destructive. No single measure in the four-year history of the Confederacy fostered more dissension among Southern society than the failure known as conscription.
